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Throughout  the  past  two  centuries,  the  U.S.  patent  system  has 
defined  the  scope  of  (potentially)  patentable  processes  by  proscribing 
patents on fundamental principles (including abstract ideas, laws of nature, 
and natural phenomena). Unfortunately,  such a description of patentable 
subject matter led to ambiguity and unpredictability in the application of 
the patent laws. In 2008, the Federal Circuit addressed this uncertainty by 
promulgating  a  new  standard  to  describe  the  ambit  of  patentable 
processes:   a  process  may constitute  patentable  subject  matter  if  (1)  it 
utilizes a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms an object 
into a different state or thing.
This  Article  describes  how  the  Federal  Circuit’s  new  standard 
furthers the underlying policy goal of all patent laws:  the incentivization 
of innovation. Specifically, this paper argues that this new rule presents a 
simple and easy to apply standard that will increase the predictability of 
the  patent  laws.  In  the  presence  of  such  predictability,  prospective 
inventors  and  investors  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  research  and 
development, thus leading to increased inventive activity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the United States patent system in 1790, the judiciary has 
grappled with a basic question of patent law:  What is the proper scope of patentable 
subject  matter?  This  issue has  proven particularly  difficult  as  it  relates  to  patents  on 
innovative processes. However, despite any associated difficulties, the resolution of this 
question is of primary importance to the proper functioning of the patent system and 
underlies its primary objective:  promoting the progress of technology. Specifically, the 
inclusion or exclusion of certain inventions from the scope of patentable subject matter 
necessarily  reflects  judgments  on  what  types  of  innovation  should  be  incentivized 
through the offer of a patent and what types of innovation must be freely available to the 
inventing public to further their work.  
Throughout the better part of the last two centuries, courts have defined the scope 
of patentable processes by proscribing patents on fundamental principles (abstract ideas, 
laws of nature, and natural phenomena).2 These prohibitions represented a “negative rule” 
approach to the scope of patentable subject matter by defining what  is not patentable. 
However,  due in large part  to difficulties  in consistently enforcing these prohibitions, 
courts have begun to deviate from the negative rule approach in recent history.  
In the early 1970s, the United States Supreme Court presented a semi-positive 
approach that described particular  instances  of what is  patentable  when it  held that a 
process was patentable  if  it  utilized a physical  apparatus or brought about a physical 
transformation in the process’s subject matter. This holding did not expressly state that 
these indicia represented the full scope of patentable processes; it simply stated that these 
were “clues” to patentability.  This decision was integral to the progression of process 
patent  jurisprudence  because  it  offered  objective  indicia  by  which  a  process’s 
patentability  could  be  judged,  as  opposed  to  making  difficult,  and  somewhat 
metaphysical,  evaluations  such  as  whether  an  invention  constitutes  an  unpatentable 
abstract idea.  
Over  the  past  fifteen  years,  the  judiciary  has  continued  the  trend  toward  the 
creation of a positive statement of the scope of patentable processes. Such a positive rule 
offers the benefit  of defining the scope of patentable  processes though reference to a 
single set of objective criteria. In the 1990s, the Federal Circuit promulgated the positive 
rule that  a process was patentable  if  it  brought about a useful, concrete,  and tangible 
result.  This standard was widely criticized and in 2008 the Federal Circuit decided to 
revisit it in In re Bilski.3
The disagreement in  Bilski arose over the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office’s  (the  USPTO’s)  holding  that  Bilski’s  invention—a  process  for  creating 
contractual  relationships  intended  to  hedge  risks  in  a  financial  transaction—did  not 
present patentable subject matter. In October 2008, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion 
2 Hereinafter the term “fundamental principles” will be used to refer collectively to abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena.
3 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
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in  Bilski and  presented  a  new  positive  standard  for  the  patentability  of  inventive 
processes:   the  Machine  or  Transformation  test.  This  test  reformulated  the  Supreme 
Court’s  semi-positive  rule  that  the  use  of  a  physical  apparatus  or  a  physical 
transformation are indicia of patentability as a positive statement of the entire scope of 
patentable  processes  under  35  U.S.C.  §  101,  the  statute  controlling  the  scope  of 
patentable subject matter.4
This Article evaluates two interrelated aspects of the  Bilski opinion. Initially, it 
assesses  Bilski and its Machine or Transformation test for consistency and congruence 
with pertinent precedent. Later parts describe  Bilski’s effect on the primary goal of the 
patent system:  the incentivization of innovation. Specifically, this goal is discussed with 
regard  to  its  relationship  with the predictable  application  of  the  patent  laws and any 
effects that Bilski might have thereon.
This evaluation of Bilski begins with a review of the history of 35 U.S.C. § 101.5 
Specifically, Part II of the Article focuses on the statutory and precedential development 
of § 101, the development  of negative rules prohibiting the patenting of fundamental 
principles,  and  §  101’s  evolution  towards  a  positive  rule  of  patentability.  Part  III 
describes the Bilski patent application (the Application) and its progression through the 
USPTO  and  the  federal  courts.  Specifically,  Part  III  describes  the  substance  of  the 
Application  and  its  treatment  within  the  USPTO,  the  Board  of  Patent  Appeals  and 
Interferences  (the  BPAI),  and  the  Federal  Circuit.  Part  IV  describes  the  Machine  or 
Transformation test as an amalgamation of judicial  precedent pertaining to § 101 and 
patentable processes. In particular, the fourth part details the Machine or Transformation 
test’s relationship with applicable precedent and addresses several related concerns set 
forth in  Bilski’s dissenting opinions. The fifth and final substantive part evaluates the 
relationship of the predictability of the patent laws and incentivization to invent. Further, 
Part  V  describes  the  means  by  which  Bilski will  enhance  both  predictability  and 
incentivization.     
II. THE HISTORY OF § 101
The scope of patentable processes is a question of the statutory interpretation of 
§ 101 of the Patent  Act.  As such,  essential  insight  into what  constitutes  a  patentable 
process can be derived from an investigation into the historical development of § 101 and 
the case law interpreting its meaning.
A. Statutory Development of § 101
Article  I  of  the  United  States  Constitution  provides  that  Congress  may  enact 
statutes “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
4 Note that the Machine or Transformation test sets forth the scope of potentially patentable 
subject matter for process inventions.  Beyond this barrier, process inventions must also satisfy 
all other statutory requirements of patentability for a patent to issue.   
5 Hereinafter, this statute will be referred to as § 101.
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Times  to  Authors  and Inventors  the  exclusive  Right  to  their  respective  Writings  and 
Discoveries.”6 Pursuant to this grant, the first patent statute was passed in 1790 during the 
second term of Congress.7 
The genesis of the modern scope of statutory subject matter was the Patent Act of 
1793, which provided that patentable subject matter consisted of “any new and useful art, 
machine,  manufacture or composition  of matter,  or  any new and useful  improvement 
[thereof].”8 This standard went largely unchanged until its amendment by the Patent Act 
of  1952,  which  replaced  the  term “art”  with  “process.”9 The  1952 enactment  further 
provided an express definition of the newly included term (“[t]he term ‘process’ means 
process,  art  or  method,  and  includes  a  new  use  of  a  known  process,  machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”).10 Statutory history indicates that the 
inclusion of this express definition was intended to clarify that the scope of § 101 that 
was previously embodied in the term “art” (and now is included in the term “process”) 
was intended to encompass both patentable processes and methods.11 The definition of 
“process”  in  §  100  was  intended  to  incorporate  the  common  law  definition  and 
limitations  of  the  term  “process”  as  it  developed  under  the  prior  statute.12 Such  a 
conclusion is further supported by the basic rule of statutory construction that “a common 
law term in  a  statute  comes  with  a  common law meaning,  absent  anything  pointing 
6 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7 The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (repealed 1793); see also W. Michael 
Schuster, Comment, Subjective Intent in the Determination of Antitrust Violations by Patent  
Holders, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 507, 511 (2007) (citing the Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 
109-10 (repealed 1793); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).  
8 An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful Arts; and to Repeal the Act Heretofore Made for 
that Purpose, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (1793) (amended 1952).  
9 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
10 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1952). 
11 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398-99).  Specifically, Nuijten quoted the legislative history to state:
[T]he word “art” which appears in the [prior] statute has been changed to the word 
“process”. “Art” in this place in the present statute has a different meaning than the words “useful 
art” in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use of the word “art” in other places in 
the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to be practically synonymous with process or 
method. The word “process” has been used to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word 
“art” as used in this place means “process or method,” and that it does not mean the same thing as 
the word “art” in other places.
The definition of “process” has been added in section 100 to make it clear that “process 
or method” is meant, and also to clarify the present law as to the patentability of certain types of 
processes or methods as to which some insubstantial doubts have been expressed.
Id. at 1355.
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another way.”13 The case law meaning of “process” found early definition through the 
imposition of “negative rules” that excluded certain inventions from § 101.
1. Negative Rules: Unpatentable Fundamental Principles
Early limitations on the scope of patentable processes took the form of negative 
prohibitions that held fundamental principles (abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural 
phenomena) to be unpatentable.14 The Supreme Court has stated that “a principle is not 
patentable.  A  principle,  in  the  abstract,  is a fundamental truth;  an  original  cause;  a 
motive; these cannot be patented,  as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right.”15  
The logic behind such negative rules of patent law was easily explained. Laws of 
nature and natural phenomena were excluded from § 101 because such manifestations 
occur within nature, and thus, are not subject to invention by man and therefore are not 
patentable  “inventions.”16 Further,  “abstract  ideas  constitute  disembodied  concepts  or 
truths which are not ‘useful’ from a practical standpoint standing alone, i.e., they are not 
‘useful’ until reduced to some practical application.”17  
12 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In support of this proposition, the Federal 
Circuit looked to three sources:
The first is 35 U.S.C. § 100(b), which defines “process” circularly to mean “process.” 
The second is the legislative history, which shows Congress approved the substitution of the term 
“process” for the term “art” used in all previous patent statutes because it had a more “readily 
grasped” meaning that had evolved in the courts. See S.Rep. No. 1979, 82nd  Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 
17 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2398-99 & 2409-10; H.Rep. No. 1923, 82nd 
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 17 (1952). See also P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., at 15-16 (1954 ed. West), reprinted in 75 [J. Pat. Off. Soc’y] 161, 176 
(1993). The third is the presumption that when a statute uses a term of art, such as “process”, 
Congress intended it to have its established meaning. See McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 
U.S. 337, 342, 111 S.Ct. 807, 810, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991); Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 
641, 74 S.Ct. 822, 824, 98 L.Ed. 1009 (1954).  
Id. at 295 n.11.
13 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57-58 (2007) (citing Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 
494, 500-01 (2000)).
14 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).    
15 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852).
16 Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1403 (B.P.A.I. 2005); Ex Parte Bilski, No. 2002-
2257, slip op. at 19 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), aff’d on other grounds, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) 
(No. 08-964).
17 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
5
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 2010
Underlying these basic proscriptions on the patenting of fundamental principles is 
the constitutional mandate that patents should be issued  “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts . . . .”18 Fundamental principles have been stated to be “part of 
the  storehouse  of  knowledge  of  all  men.”19 The  keeping  of  such  a  non-statutory 
“storehouse” was meant to establish a source of basic information that would promote 
new innovation by providing knowledge from which future inventors could create new 
inventions.20 By contrast, a new and useful implementation of a fundamental principle—
an  advancement  of  technology,  as  opposed  to  the  fundamental  principle  that  might 
underlie that advancement—may constitute statutory subject matter.21 An early example 
of the Court’s willingness to preserve this storehouse of ideas was set forth in O'Reilly v.  
Morse.22  
In 1840, Samuel Morse received a patent on his invention of the electromagnetic 
telegraph, and in 1848 the patent was reissued.23 This patent was evaluated by the Court 
to determine, among other things, the validity of its eighth claim, which stated:  
Eighth. I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts 
of  machinery  described  in  the  foregoing  specification  and  claims;  the 
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric 
or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed 
for  marking  or  printing  intelligible  characters,  signs,  or  letters,  at  any 
distances, being a new application of that power of which I claim to be the 
first inventor or discoverer.24
In  evaluating  this  claim,  the Court  initially  noted that  the scope of the patent 
claimed “the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the electric 
or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing of intelligible characters, 
signs, or letters at a distance.”25 The claim was rejected because the grant of such a broad 
patent would likely hinder the “onward march of science,” in that any future invention 
18 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
20 Robert A. Matthews, 3 Annotated Patent Digest § 20:10 (Sept. 2009 update) (“[The 
Supreme Court has made] a basic judgment that [patent] protection [of fundamental principles], 
despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely interfere with, or 
discourage, development and the further spread of useful knowledge itself.”) (quoting Lab. Corp.  
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
21 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978).
22 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
23 Id. at 106.
24 Id. at 112.
25 Id.  
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that used electromagnetism to communicate characters or symbols would fall within the 
ambit  of  Morse’s  eighth  claim.  The  patent  could  be  infringed  regardless  of  whether 
Morse’s specification had described—or if Morse had even previously contemplated—
the particular means of electromagnetic communication.26 Had Morse’s eighth claim been 
deemed  valid,  it  would  have  stripped  bare  the  storehouse  of  ideas  with  regard  to 
electromagnetic  communications  to  the hindrance  of  future inventors  and the  general 
public.  In  order  to  avoid  this  outcome,  the  Court  deemed  Morse’s  claims  describing 
specific implementations of this technology to be valid, but rejected any claim that would 
allow Morse to preclude all further research within the field by patenting a fundamental 
principle—here, the idea of communication of characters via electromagnetic means.  
A  comparison  of  the  Supreme  Court  cases  of  Gottschalk  v.  Benson27 and 
Diamond v. Diehr28 illustrates the modern implementation of the prohibition on patenting 
fundamental principles. In these cases, the Court attempted to clarify what constitutes an 
abstract  idea  as  a  legitimate  element  of  a  patentable  invention  versus  an  illegitimate 
attempt to patent a fundamental principle.  
Benson involved  a  patent  application  claiming  a  mathematical  algorithm 
embodied  in  a  program  embedded  in  a  piece  of  hardware  to  convert  binary-coded 
decimal numerals to pure binary numerals.29 In rejecting Benson’s application, the Court 
noted that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual  concepts  are  not  patentable,  as  they  are  the  basic  tools  of  scientific  and 
technological work.”30 In applying this rule to the claimed subject matter, the Court found 
that Benson’s application sought protection of a fundamental principle and that to grant 
the  requested  patent  would  preclude  any further  use of  the  algorithm.31 Accordingly, 
Benson’s application for a patent was rejected. By rejecting Benson’s claims, the Court 
prohibited the removal of the entire mathematical algorithm from the storehouse of tools 
available to inventors. 
In contrast, the Court in  Diehr found an inventive application of a fundamental 
principle  statutory32 because  it  was  embodied  in  an  otherwise  patentable  process. 
Specifically,  Diehr  claimed  an  improved  process  for  curing  raw  rubber  into  usable 
products comprising the use of the Arrhenius equation.33 Prior art taught the use of the 
equation to determine the proper amount of time necessary to cure rubber, but such a 
26 Id. at 113.
27 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
28 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
29 Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. Binary-coded decimal numerals represent each individual digit of a 
numeral with a string of ones and zeros, while pure binary numerals replace the numeral, as a 
whole, with a string of ones and zeros. Id. at 66-67.
30 Id. at 67.
31 Id. at 71-72.
32 A statutory invention (or statutory subject matter) is an invention that falls within the scope 
of § 101.  
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calculation was impaired by the user’s inability to measure the internal temperature of the 
processing vessel.34 Diehr’s process provided a means by which the internal temperature 
of the system was constantly monitored, the temperature fed into a computer, and the 
optimal cure time calculated by the computer utilizing the Arrhenius equation.35 Thus, 
since the claimed invention was directed to an improved means of curing rubber, which 
used  as  a  constituent  element  the  Arrhenius  equation,  the  Court  concluded  that  the 
claimed  invention  was  limited  in  scope  (curing  rubber)  and  would  not  completely 
preempt all future use of the Arrhenius equation.36 This holding was distinguished from 
Benson in  that  Diehr  sought  a  patent  for  an  individual  application  of  a  fundamental 
principle, whereas to grant the application in  Benson would have effectively prevented 
any  further  use  of  that  particular  “tool”  of  invention  (the  underlying  mathematical 
algorithm).  
  These cases aptly describe the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to find statutory 
subject matter  if a party attempted to, in essence,  gain protection over a fundamental 
principle. The underlying motivations of  Benson  and  Diehr are clear:  they preserve a 
stockpile of basic ideas from which future inventors can draw inspiration. However, in 
addition, these cases embodied difficulties that were common in applying the prohibition 
on the patenting of fundamental principles, e.g., what is the exact standard to be derived 
from  Benson’s  finding  that  a  mathematical  algorithm  implemented  by  means  of  a 
computer  is  unpatentable  and  Diehr’s  holding  that  use  of  the  Arrhenius  equation  in 
rubber curing is a patentable application of a fundamental principle? While the law is 
clear that patents cannot be granted on a fundamental principle unless embodied in an 
otherwise  patentable  invention,  deriving  the  exact  line  of  demarcation  between  a 
fundamental principle and an implementation thereof presents difficult and interrelated 
problems  that  the  USPTO  and  the  courts  are  ill  equipped  to  address.  Specifically, 
inherently difficult metaphysical questions such as “What is an abstract idea?” or “What 
is the claimed invention?” are not the expertise of judges or patent examiners but rather 
philosophers.37  
33 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
34 Id. at 177-78.
35 Id. at 178-79.
36 Id. at 191-93.  
37 See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 134 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“I concede that the category of non-patentable ‘phenomena of nature,’ like the 
categories of ‘mental processes,’ and ‘abstract intellectual concepts,’ is not easy to define.”); see 
also 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.03 (2006) (discussing the early difficulties in 
defining what constituted a patentable process). The shortcoming of the USPTO in this area was 
aptly described by Dr. Roberta Morris, who stated:
Examiners must have a technical background to apply for their jobs.  (See “Patent 
Examiner Positions,” Part 3. Qualification Requirements, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited April 3, 2008).) Once hired, they 
learn at the Patent Academy and on the job how to find prior art which may anticipate or render 
8
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 2010
Further, the general difficulty in applying these negative prohibitions on patenting 
fundamental principles is displayed by the courts’ constant attempts to restate or explain 
these prohibitions though secondary rules. Examples of such secondary rules include:  the 
Mental Steps Doctrine (“processes involving mental operations [are] unpatentable”),38 the 
Function of a Machine Doctrine (a process consisting of “a description of the function of 
a machine [is]  unpatentable”),39 and  the Printed  Matter  Doctrine  (“patentable novelty 
cannot be principally predicated on mere printed matter and arrangements thereof”).40
a. Semi-Positive Rules:  Clues to Patentability
In recognizing the difficulty in consistent enforcement of the general prohibition 
on patenting fundamental principles, the courts began to look for objective indicia of a 
patentable process that could easily be discerned. Such indicators of patentable processes 
would  allow  the  USPTO and  the  courts  to  remain  true  to  the  principles  behind  the 
exclusion of fundamental principles from the scope of § 101, while avoiding the difficult 
questions  associated  with  enforcing  this  exclusion.  These  initial  forays  into  finding 
objective  indicia  of  a  patentable  process  sought  to  discern  common  indications  of 
patentability from precedent, but did not attempt to explicitly define the entire scope of 
patentable processes.  
In  Gottschalk  v.  Benson,  when  attempting  to  determine  whether  the  claimed 
method  of  converting  binary-coded  decimal  numerals  to  pure  binary  numerals  was 
patentable,  the  Supreme  Court  evaluated  prior  precedent  and  noted  two  continuing 
themes  of  patentable  processes.41 Specifically,  the Court  set  forth  two indicia  that  an 
application claimed a patentable implementation of a fundamental principle:  (1) the use 
of a machine or apparatus, or (2) a physical transformation of the subject matter of the 
obvious an applicant's claims. (Ibid., Part 4. Responsibilities, Training and Advancement.) By 
focusing on the questions of validity over the prior art and the adequacy of the inventor's 
disclosure to the public, the Patent Office employs its special expertise.
By contrast, what constitutes patentable subject matter under 101 is a philosophical and 
abstract inquiry, unrelated to the essential question “What did applicants invent?” (see, e.g., 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2106 (8th ed., Rev. 6, Sept. 2007)), and to what the 
prior art teaches. 
Brief for Roberta J. Morris, Esq., Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5-6, 
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 
S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964), 2008 WL 1842256.
38 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 195.
39 Id. at 196.
40 In re Montgomery, 214 F.2d 136, 139 (C.C.P.A. 1954).
41 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).  
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process.42 The Court expressly noted that these indications of a patentable process were 
not exclusive.43 Accordingly, while not recognizing a positive test describing the entire 
scope of patentable processes, the Court did expressly provide two positive statements of 
what constitutes statutory subject matter.
b. Early Positive Rules:  A Confused State of Affairs
Beyond the initial semi-positive statements of indicia of patentable processes, the 
judiciary moved towards  a  specific,  positive  test  that  could be applied  to objectively 
describe  the scope of  § 101 (as opposed to merely noting specific  indications  that  a 
process  was  statutory).  Unfortunately,  the  rush  to  set  forth  such  a  rule  led  to  the 
promulgation of multiple rules. Accordingly,  the exact breadth of a patentable process 
became muddier instead of clearer. In its attempts to set forth an objective test that would 
easily  weed out  unpatentable  fundamental  principles,  the  judiciary  undercut  itself  by 
creating multiple tests.  Several of these standards are described below.
The Federal Circuit has interpreted the IP Clause to require that the patent laws 
promote “technological innovation.”44 Such an understanding of the Constitution has led 
some to suggest that  the proper scope of patentability under § 101 should be defined 
under a “Technological Arts” test. This standard has been stated as such:  “[a]ll that is 
necessary . . . to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35 
U.S.C.A. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the 
Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of the ‘useful arts.’”45 Eventually,  this 
standard was dismissed as a distinct test for patentability.46 However, some still hold that 
satisfaction of the Technological Arts test is a threshold matter to patentability,  in that 
only a technological invention can potentially fall within the stated ambit of § 101.47  
Further, the Federal Circuit set forth the  Freeman-Walter-Abele test to describe 
the  patentability  of  a  process  comprising  a  mathematical  algorithm.48 This  two-step 
standard  requires  the  determination  of  whether  a  mathematical  algorithm  is  claimed 
(directly or indirectly); if so, whether the invention is merely “a mathematical algorithm 
that  is  not  applied to or limited  by physical  elements  or process steps” must  also be 
42 Id. 
43 Id.
44 Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
45 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
46 Ex Parte Bilski, Appeal 2002-2257, slip op. at 41 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), aff’d on other  
grounds, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964). 
47 Id. at 30.
48 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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established.49 Should a court or the USPTO find that a mathematical algorithm claimed is 
not associated with a physical element, it should reject that claim.  
Moreover, courts attempted to define the ambit of § 101 through a “preemption” 
analysis  derived  from  Diamond  v.  Diehr.50 In  Diehr,  the  Court  granted  certiorari  to 
determine whether a process, in light of its use of a known mathematical equation, was 
statutory.51 Initially,  the  Court  restated  the  truism  that  “laws  of  nature,  natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are outside the ambit of the patent laws.52 In contrast, an 
application of such a non-patentable  element  may obtain protection if it  is part  of an 
otherwise patentable invention.53 However, to constitute such a statutory application, the 
Court noted that the claimed process must not attempt to cover a broad range of uses for 
the underlying fundamental principle, such as claiming all uses of an equation within a 
field of use.54 Accordingly, the Court recognized that attempts to preempt all uses of a 
fundamental principle are not statutory, whereas a particularized use of such a principle 
could potentially be patented.55
In 1998, the Federal Circuit addressed this confused state of § 101 jurisprudence 
in  State  Street  Bank  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Signature  Financial  Group,  Inc.56 State  Street 
attempted to adopt a single unifying standard for patentability of processes:  the Useful, 
Concrete, and Tangible test.  
c. Pre-Bilski:  the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Test
State Street’s reevaluation of § 101 was sparked when the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff (State Street) asserted that Signature Financial’s patented system for maintaining 
a “partner fund financial services configuration” did not claim statutory subject matter.57 
The patent claimed the means to allocate (on a daily basis) the assets of multiple entities 
49 Id.
50 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1980).
51 Id. at 179-81.
52 Id. at 185 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
53 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187-88. 
54 Id. at 191-92.  
55 Id.; see also In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 906 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (overruled on other grounds).
56 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
57 Id. at 1370-71. 
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investing in a singular “hub” investment.58 The claims set forth a data processing system 
containing a generic means to perform each required step in the allocation process.59 
At trial, the district court found the claims not patentable because they fell under 
two  exceptions  to  the  scope  of  §  101:   the  Mathematical  Algorithm  exception  (as 
explained under the Freeman-Walter-Abele test) and the Business Method exception (a 
doctrine precluding the patenting of business methods).60 After extensive discussion of 
both doctrines, the Federal Circuit expressly abolished both exceptions and adopted the 
Useful, Concrete, and Tangible test.61 Under this standard, “the transformation of data . . . 
by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations . . . constitutes a practical 
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces ‘a 
useful, concrete and tangible result.’”62 As such,  State Street  stands for the proposition 
that “a process is patentable if it produces a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result.’”63
Since its inception, the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible test has been the subject of 
widespread criticism.64 The most notable critique came in 2006 in the Supreme Court’s 
dismissal  of  the  writ  of  certiorari,  as  being  improvidently  granted,  for  Laboratory 
Corporation  of  America  Holdings  v.  Metabolite  Laboratories,  Inc.65 Justice  Breyer, 
joined  by  Justices  Stevens  and  Souter,  wrote  separately  to  address  the  relationship 
between  unpatentable  fundamental  principles  and  process  patents.66 The  dissent 
recognized that such unpatentable elements can comprise a legitimate process patent, but 
focused  upon  the  standard  to  be  applied  in  determining  the  patentability  of  such 
inventions.67
58 Id. at 1371.   
59 Id. at 1371-72.
60 Id. at 1372-75.
61 Id. at 1373.
62 Id. 
63 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert.  
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964). It is of note that 
State Street expressly dealt with a machine patent, but that the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible 
standard expressed therein was expressly extended to patented processes.  AT&T Corp. v. Excel  
Comm’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999), overruled by Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60.
64 See, e.g., discussion infra note 71.
65 548 U.S. at 124 (per curiam).
66 Id. at 134-36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
67 Id.  
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Justice Breyer rebuffed assertions that the proper standard is whether a process 
produces a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”68 The dissent stated that the Court has 
never  recognized  such  a  test,  and  that  if  read  literally,  the  State  Street  test  for 
patentability of a process would conflict with Supreme Court precedent such as  Morse, 
Flook,69 and Benson. Specifically, Justice Breyer posited:
The  Court,  for  example,  has  invalidated  a  claim  to  the  use  of 
electromagnetic  current  for  transmitting  messages  over  long  distances 
even  though  it  produces  a  result  that  seems  “useful,  concrete,  and 
tangible.” [O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).] Similarly the Court has 
invalidated a patent setting forth a system for triggering alarm limits in 
connection with catalytic conversion despite a similar utility, concreteness, 
68 Id. at 136-37.
69 Flook addressed the question of whether the addition of a conventional process to a novel 
mathematical formula yielded a patentable process. In pertinent part, the Supreme Court 
answered that a novel mathematical formula could not become a statutory invention through the 
addition of an otherwise non-novel process. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978). However, 
in contrast, where an invention, considered as a whole, incorporates a novel mathematical 
formula into some inventive application of that formula, a patent may properly issue. Id. at 594.
Flook filed a patent application on a “Method for Updating Alarm Limits.” Id. at 585. 
The patent application described a three step process to adjust the point at which an alarm sounds 
during a catalytic conversion process because some process variable, such as temperature, 
pressure, or flow rate, is outside the normal range of values. Id. The process consisted of three 
primary steps:  1. measuring process variables for which an alarm limit is to be set, 2. calculating 
a new alarm limit to be implemented in the system through the use of a novel mathematical 
formula, and 3. implementing the new alarm limits. Id. at 585-86. The sole novel aspect of the 
process was the mathematical formula. Id. at 585.  
The Flook Court expressly stated that the crux of the case was whether Flook could 
survive a § 101 analysis. Id. at 588. In starting its analysis, the Court recognized that “post-
solution activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, [cannot] transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process . . . .” Id. at 590. However, an otherwise new, 
useful, and non-obvious invention that is created utilizing such an unpatentable principle may 
receive protection. Id. at 591 (citing Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 
86, 94 (1939)). Further, a non-statutory principle cannot obtain patent protection simply by 
adding a limitation to the claim that the invention should be used within a single technology. Id. 
at 590. To apply such a rule, a court must view the patent as a whole, and determine whether a 
patentable invention is present; the presence or non-presence of an unpatentable phenomenon of 
nature or mathematical formula as an element of the invention should not be considered 
individually. Id. at 594.        
In applying this standard, the Court noted that the application, in essence, claimed a novel 
mathematical formula “tied to a specific end use” (calculating alarm limits). Id. at 594-95. As 
such, pursuant to the previously elucidated rule, the Court found that Flook was attempting to 
claim an unpatentable mathematical formula dressed up with non-novel extra-solution activities 
(a data gathering step and a field restriction). Id. at 595. Accordingly, the invention was deemed 
outside the scope of § 101.
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and tangibility. [Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).] And the Court has 
invalidated a patent setting forth a process that transforms, for computer-
programming purposes, decimal figures into binary figures—even though 
the result would seem useful, concrete, and at least arguably (within the 
computer's wiring system) tangible.  [Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 
(1972).]70
In addition to Justice Breyer’s assessment of the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible 
test,  a  question  exists  as  to  what  exactly  this  standard  was  meant  to  embody.71 For 
example, the USPTO’s interpretation of this rule seems inconsistent with basic maxims 
of  statutory  construction.  “It  is  a  long-held  tenet  of  statutory  interpretation  that  one 
section of a law should not be interpreted so as to render another section meaningless.”72 
However,  an  exacting  assessment  of  the  Useful,  Concrete,  and  Tangible  test,  as 
interpreted by the USPTO, renders it redundant of the utility inquiry under § 101, thus 
70 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 136-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71 See, e.g., Christopher A. Harkins, Throwing Judge Bryson’s Curveball: A Pro Patent View 
of Process Claims as Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, l7 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 701, 728 
(2008). Specifically, this article noted that:
[The Useful, Concrete, and Tangible test is] not the guidance needed right now to help 
the Patent Office, practitioners, or courts. And each of the individual adjectives introduces a 
further element of uncertainty.
"Concrete"—whatever that means—drew laughter when counsel and the bench conceded 
not to know what it meant [during the Bilski en banc hearing].  Perhaps it simply means necessary 
but not sufficient, in which case it is better addressed under § 112, ¶ 2. 
"Tangible" seems to mean "real world." Most inventions are for an economic purpose—
i.e., real world. In the final analysis, "real world" seems subjective, unconventional, and random.
"Useful" is already in § 101. As such, it is redundant.
Id. (internal citations omitted).  Another commenter, describing the effect of State Street, 
stated:
Although State Street only upheld the patentability of a data processing computer 
program, many applicants interpreted the decision as to make any and all types of business 
methods patent-eligible so long as the method produces a "useful, tangible, and concrete" result, a 
test left undefined by the [Federal Circuit]. Therefore, after State Street the demarcating line 
between patentable processes and unpatentable abstract ideas was blurred.
Lilly He, In re Bilski En Banc Rehearing on Patentable Subject Matter: Farewell to 
Business Method Patents?, 14 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 252, 255 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted).
72 Princess Cruises v. United States, 201 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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leaving one section or the other meaningless.73 An evaluation of the USPTO’s working 
definitions of “useful,” “concrete,” and “tangible” will demonstrate this redundancy.  
The  USPTO’s  Manual  of  Patent  Examining  Procedure74 states  that  “[f]or  an 
invention  to  be  ‘useful’  it  must  satisfy  the  utility  requirement  of  section  101.”75 
Moreover, “concrete” is defined as “hav[ing] a result that can be substantially repeatable 
or  the  process  must  substantially  produce  the  same  result  again.”76 Repeatability, 
however, is cited as an element of the utility requirement.77 Furthermore, the tangibility 
requirement has been defined as necessitating that an invention produce a “real-world 
result.”78 Such a result is defined as an element of substantial utility.79 Accordingly, all 
three elements of the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible test are prerequisites to a finding of 
utility. 
The Federal Circuit has recognized the utility and subject matter requirements as 
distinct  inquiries  under  §  101.80 As  such,  it  is  necessarily  an  improper  statutory 
interpretation  to  define  patentable  subject  matter  in  terms  of  a  useful,  concrete,  and 
tangible result when the utility requirement of § 101 already requires such results.
The  Federal  Circuit  must  necessarily  abide  by  Supreme  Court  precedent.81 
Further, the Federal Circuit’s creation was intended to establish a predictable application 
73 See Kenneth N. Nigon, Advanced Specification Drafting Issues Electronic and Computer  
Inventions, 909 PLI/Pat 209, 255-56 (2007); Charles A. Damschen, Patentable Subject Matter:  
Do the 2005 USPTO Interim Guidelines Intersect State Street at a Roundabout?, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 
1889, 1916 (2008).
74 The MPEP does not carry the weight of law.  As such, the USPTO conundrum described 
above is merely given as an example of the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the Useful, 
Concrete, and Tangible test.  Molins PLC v. Textron Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (noting that the MPEP does not carry the weight of law but is entitled to judicial notice). 
75 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure § 2106(IV)(C)(2)(2)(a) (8th ed., 7th revision 2008) [hereinafter MPEP]; see also 
Nigon, supra note 73, at 255-56.
76 MPEP § 2106(IV)(C)(2)(2)(c) (citing In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see  
also Nigon, supra note 73, at 255-56.
77 Damschen, supra note 73, at 1916 (“[A] claim that does not achieve a repeatable result will 
not be eligible for patent protection due to the claim's failure to meet the utility requirement in 
§ 101 (according to the Federal Circuit's and the USPTO's interpretation of that requirement in 
conjunction with § 112).”); see also Nigon, supra note 73, at 255-56.
78 MPEP § 2106(IV)(C)(2)(2)(b) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)); 
Nigon, supra note 73, at 256.  
79 MPEP § 2107.01(I)(B).  
80 See Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l. Game Tech., 543 F.3d 657, 661 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“Although the Supreme Court in Graham referred only to the utility requirement aspect of 
section 101, as we often do, it is beyond question that section 101's other requirement, that the 
invention be directed to patentable subject matter, is also a condition for patentability.”).  
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of U.S. patent laws.82 As discussed above, State Street’s Useful, Concrete, and Tangible 
test  does  neither.  Accordingly,  a  reevaluation  of  this  standard  was  warranted.  Bilski 
provided such an opportunity.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE BILSKI PATENT APPLICATION
The Application and its associated judicial history embody the confused state of 
affairs  regarding  the  scope  of  patentable  processes  prior  to  Bilski.  Accordingly,  an 
investigation into the history of the Application will demonstrate the need for a clear, 
positive standard of the scope of § 101 that led to  Bilski’s adoption of the Machine or 
Transformation test.  
A. The Application, the USPTO, and the BPAI
Bilski sought to patent a method of hedging risks associated with purchasing and 
selling commodities subject to price fluctuations.83 The claimed process consisted of:  (1) 
initiating a series of sales between a provider of some commodity and consumers of that 
commodity,  (2)  identifying  parties  with  a  risk  position  opposite  to  the  commodity 
consumers, and (3) initiating a series of transactions between the commodity provider 
and a third party with a risk interest opposite to the consumer at a price sufficient to 
81 Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (overruled on 
other grounds) (“[I]t is the duty of a court of appeals to follow the precedents of the Supreme 
Court until the Court itself chooses to expressly overrule them.”).
82 Robert C. Morgan & Matthew A. Traupman, Claim Construction Methodologies and 
Problems, 837 PLI/Pat 147, 155 (2005).
83 Ex Parte Bilski, Appeal 2002-2257, slip op. at 1 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), aff’d on other  
grounds, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).  Claim 1 of the Application (08/833, 892) 
reads:
1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a 
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of 
said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon 
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to 
said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market 
participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances 
the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.
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account for the variance in risk interests.84 In essence, the Application claimed a method 
by which an intermediary party could hedge risks by agreeing to purchase a commodity 
at  some set  price from a selling party averse to either  an increase or decrease in the 
selling price of the commodity, and by then entering into a second deal at a second set 
price with a buying party whose aversion to risk is opposite to that of the selling party. 
By entering  into  such  a  series  of  agreements,  the  intermediary  allows  each  party  to 
insulate itself from an increase or decrease in the price of the commodity (for the lifetime 
of the agreements).85  
During examination, the patent examiner did not rely on prior art in rejecting the 
Application,86 but rather found the claims to not embody statutory subject matter.87 In 
noting  that  the  claimed  process  did  not  require  any  physical  apparatus  (such  as  a 
computer),  the  examiner  stated  that  “the  invention  is  not  implemented  on  a  specific 
apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract  idea and solves a purely mathematical 
problem without any limitation to a practical application, [and] therefore, the invention is 
not directed to the technological arts.”88 From this, the examiner found:  (1) the claimed 
subject  matter  to  consist  of  a  non-statutory  fundamental  principle  (a  mathematical 
algorithm);  and  (2)  the  claims  to  be  unpatentable  under  the  Technological  Arts  test 
because the claimed invention did not embody an “application of science and engineering 
to the development of machines and procedures in order to enhance or improve human 
84 Id. at 2.  
85 In its opinion, the Federal Circuit gave the following example to clarify the claimed subject 
matter:
In essence, the claim is for a method of hedging risk in the field of commodities trading. 
For example, coal power plants (i.e., the “consumers”) purchase coal to produce electricity and 
are averse to the risk of a spike in demand for coal since such a spike would increase the price 
and their costs. Conversely, coal mining companies (i.e., the “market participants”) are averse to 
the risk of a sudden drop in demand for coal since such a drop would reduce their sales and 
depress prices. The claimed method envisions an intermediary, the “commodity provider,” that 
sells coal to the power plants at a fixed price, thus isolating the power plants from the possibility 
of a spike in demand increasing the price of coal above the fixed price. The same provider buys 
coal from mining companies at a second fixed price, thereby isolating the mining companies from 
the possibility that a drop in demand would lower prices below that fixed price. And the provider 
has thus hedged its risk; if demand and prices skyrocket, it has sold coal at a disadvantageous 
price but has bought coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and prices fall.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949-50 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. 
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964). 
86 Ex Parte Bilski, Appeal 2002-2257, slip op. at 1-2.
87 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
88 Ex Parte Bilski, Appeal 2002-2257, slip op. at 2 (citation and quotation marks omitted) 
(insertion in original); see also Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
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conditions,  or at  least  improve human efficiency in some respect.”89 Accordingly,  the 
patent examiner rejected the application.90 Bilski timely sought review of the rejection.
On  appeal,  in  considering  whether  the  Application  claimed  a  fundamental 
principle, the BPAI rejected the Technological Arts test employed by the examiner as 
unsupported by case law.91 Instead, based on the application of the Useful, Concrete, and 
Tangible  test  to  the  claims  and  the  exclusion  of  abstract  ideas  from  the  scope  of 
patentable subject matter  principle,  the BPAI affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the 
Application.92 Bilski timely appealed to the Federal Circuit.
a. The Bilski Federal Circuit Panel Hearing
On  October  1,  2007,  Bilski  was  argued  before  a  three  judge  Federal  Circuit 
panel.93 Prior to issuing an opinion in the case, the Federal Circuit decided to hold a re-
hearing en banc.94 The court requested supplemental briefing on five questions:
(1) Whether claim 1 of the 08/833,892 patent application claims patent-
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
(2)  What  standard  should  govern  in  determining  whether  a  process  is 
patent-eligible subject matter under section 101?
(3) Whether the claimed subject matter  is not patent-eligible because it 
constitutes  an abstract  idea  or  mental  process;  when does  a  claim that 
contains  both  mental  and  physical  steps  create  patent-eligible  subject 
matter?
(4) Whether a method or process must result in a physical transformation 
of an article or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible subject matter 
under section 101?
(5) Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street Bank & Trust Co.  
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and 
AT&T Corp.  v.  Excel  Communications,  Inc.,  172 F.3d 1352 (Fed.  Cir. 
89 Ex Parte Bilski, Appeal 2002-2257, slip op. at 3-4 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), aff’d on other 
grounds, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).   
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 12.
92 Id. at 20-22. 
93 In re Bilski, 264 Fed. Appx. 896, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unreported opinion).
94 Id. at 896-97.
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1999), in this case and, if so, whether those cases should be overruled in 
any respect?95
The invitation to file briefs on these issues was extended to parties and amici 
curiae (without leave of the court).96
b. The Bilski Federal Circuit En Banc Opinion
Prior to the en banc rehearing on the patentability of the claims contained in the 
Application, the Federal Circuit received over 30 briefs from amici curiae.97 On May 8, 
2008, the Federal  Circuit  heard re-argument  of the case,  and on October 30,  2008 it 
issued its opinion.98
Initially, the court noted that the Application was drawn to an inventive “process” 
(as opposed to a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) and as such, expressly 
limited its discussion to the definition of the term “process” under § 101.99 The court 
further  defined  the  issue  by  recognizing  that  a  necessary  difficulty  in  defining  what 
constitutes a statutory process was establishing a test that would exclude claims drawn to 
a fundamental principle.100  
Bilski then described the landscape of § 101 case law and specifically recognized 
two pertinent precedents from Supreme Court holdings:  (1) a process does not claim or 
preempt the use of a fundamental principle if it is attached to a physical apparatus, and 
(2)  the application  of  a  fundamental  principle  within  a  process  that  brings  about  the 
transformation of an article to a different state or thing does not claim the fundamental 
principle.101 From  such  precedent,  the  Federal  Circuit  derived  the  “Machine  or 
Transformation” test to describe the scope of patentable processes. Specifically, the court 
stated that a process is patentable if:  “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”102 In addition to the 
basic elements of the Machine or Transformation test, the Federal Circuit established two 
95 Id. at 897.
96 Id.
97 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
98 Id. at 949.  
99 Id. at 951.
100 Id. at 952.
101 Id. at 954.  
102 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 
(1972)).  
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additional  requirements  of a statutory process:  (1) “the use of a specific machine or 
transformation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart 
patent-eligibility”  and  (2)  “the  involvement  of  the  machine  or  transformation  in  the 
claimed  process  must  not  merely  be  insignificant  extra-solution  activity.”103 Bilski 
expressly withheld any further discussion of the “machine” portion of the test,  as the 
Application was conceded to not contain any physical limitations.104
In applying the transformation portion of the test to the Application,  the court 
expressly stated that the “transformation” of legal obligations or relationships was not 
sufficient  to  pass  muster  under  the  Machine  or  Transformation  test  because  these 
“transformations” did not effect a change in a physical object; nor did these obligations or 
relationships  represent  any  physical  objects.105 Based  upon  this  definition  of 
“transformation,” the Federal Circuit held that Bilski sought to claim unpatentable subject 
matter and affirmed the rejection of the Application.106
IV. THE MACHINE OR TRANSFORMATION TEST AND STARE DECISIS
During  its  construction  of  §  101,  the  Bilski court  was  required  to  fashion  a 
standard consistent with prior case law. Accordingly, the court derived the Machine or 
Transformation test from prior Supreme Court cases addressing the scope of § 101.  
In  Gottschalk v. Benson, the Supreme Court recognized two indicia of statutory 
subject matter established in prior case law:  (1) a process is patentable if it is “tied to a 
particular  machine  or  apparatus”107 or  (2)  a  process  is  patentable  if  it  brings about  a 
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing.’”108 Clearly, the 
indications of what may constitute patentable subject matter set forth in  Benson are the 
direct  antecedents  of the  Bilski standard that describes the entire scope of § 101 (the 
Machine or Transformation test).109    
It  is  of  note  that  immediately  after  recognizing  the  aforementioned  indicia  of 
statutory subject matter, Benson stated that it “[did] not hold that no process patent could 
ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.”110 Thus, while 
the Court in  Benson recognized two specific examples of  what is patentable, it did not 
103 Id. at 961-62 (citations omitted).  
104 Id. at 962.
105 Id. at 963-64.
106 Id. at 965-66.
107 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
108 Id. at 70 (quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 721 (1880)).    
109 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
110 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
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expressly state that these indicia defined the entire scope of patentable processes.111 As 
such,  Benson’s  statement  that  the  use  of  a  machine  or  a  physical  transformation  are 
indicative of a patentable process must be differentiated from Bilski’s statement that the 
Machine  or  Transformation  test  describes  the  complete  scope  of  statutory  processes 
under § 101.  Bilski properly addressed this limitation.
Initially, in Bilski the Federal Circuit argued that the Supreme Court had, despite 
its express statement in  Benson to the alternative, held that the patentability test for a 
process was the use of a machine or a transformation.112 As noted in Bilski, the Benson 
court stated that the use of a machine or a transformation “is the clue to the patentability 
of a process claim.”113 From the use of the exclusive term “the” (as opposed to the open 
term  “a”),  the  Federal  Circuit  reasoned  that  Benson intended  the  Machine  or 
Transformation test to be the sole standard for patentability of processes under § 101. 
Regardless  of  the  strength  of  this  argument,  Bilski  left  sufficient  breathing  room to 
accommodate the statement in Benson that it “[did] not hold that no process patent could 
ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.”114
Specifically,  after  its  discussion  of  Supreme Court  precedent  and whether  the 
Machine or Transformation test presented the exclusive bounds of patentable processes, 
Bilski expressly recognized  “the possibility that  this court  may in the future refine or 
augment the test or how it is applied” in order to accommodate “future developments in 
technology  and  the  sciences.”115 This  statement  is  consistent  with  Benson’s  express 
purpose  not  to  “freeze  process  patents  to  old  technologies,  leaving  no  room for  the 
revelations  of  the  new,  onrushing  technology”  by leaving  open the  possibility  that  a 
process could be patentable without reciting a machine or transformation.116
A. Judge Newman’s Dissent:  Adherence to Precedent
The flexibility inherent in the potential to revisit the Machine or Transformation 
test adequately addresses a repeated theme that Judge Newman set forth in her dissent to 
Bilski.  Specifically,  Judge  Newman  argued  that  the  Machine  or  Transformation  test 
deviates  from precedent,  which  held  that  processes  involving  a  machine  or  physical 
111 Although Benson addressed process claims, the Federal Circuit has recognized that its logic 
applies equally to process claims and apparatus claims, including means-plus-function language 
because “the form of the claim is often an exercise in drafting.” In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 
1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
112 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955-56.
113 Id. (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)) (alteration in original).  
114 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
115 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964). 
116 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
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transformation are not the only possible patentable processes.117 Her dissent cites prior 
case law to note that the Supreme Court has intentionally construed § 101 to not exclude 
“new, onrushing technology.”118 Bilski expressly stated that if new fields of technology 
arise that cannot properly be dealt with under the present standard, courts may revisit the 
Machine  or  Transformation  test.  Thus,  even though  Bilski presently  limits  patentable 
processes  to  those  inventions  which  satisfy  the  Machine  or  Transformation  test,  it 
provides sufficient  flexibility to allow § 101 jurisprudence to evolve to accommodate 
unforeseen  future  technologies.  This  understanding  of  Bilski is  consistent  with Judge 
Newman’s assertion that § 101 should be a “dynamic provision designed to encompass 
new and unforeseen inventions.”119  
Beyond adherence to precedent, Judge Newman’s concerns with the rule set forth 
in Bilski may also relate to a potential undercutting of the primary purpose of the patent 
laws:   encouraging  innovation.120 However,  Bilski expressly  provides  the  flexibility 
necessary to accommodate future technologies to which the Machine or Transformation 
test does not currently grant protection. Furthermore, innovation in a new and unforeseen 
area  of  technology would  be  incentivized  outside  of  the  patent  system.  A party  that 
engages  in research and development  of a new technology will  enjoy a  head start  in 
marketing its new invention or products created utilizing a new process.121 This advantage 
allows the inventor to recoup the investment in research and development by acting for a 
time as the sole provider of the new product or process.122  
This  model,  while  providing  the  economic  incentive  to  invent  to  the  initial 
inventor,  does  not  provide  for  public  dissemination  of  the  new  technology.  Some 
inefficiency arises due to the delay between the creation of a new technology and the 
adjustment of the Machine or Transformation test to accommodate it because, unless they 
seek patent protection, inventors are under no obligation to make their inventions public.  
However, some suggest that,  absent patent protection,  parties will  immediately 
release new technologies to the public in the hopes of utilizing their head start to reap 
higher profits.123 Unfortunately, in some instances, the benefit of public dissemination of 
117 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 978-86 (Newman, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 973 (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 71).  
119 Id. at 983 (quoting J.E.M. Agric. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 135 
(2001)).  
120 Id. at 977 (emphasis omitted); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
121 David Encaoua et al., Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic  
Analysis, 35 Res. Pol’y 1423, 1426 (2006).  
122 Id. at 1426-28 (citing Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Intellectual  
Property, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers and Proc.) 209, 209-12 (2002)).
123 See generally Tuomas Takalo & Vesa Kanniainen, Do Patents Slow Down Technological  
Progress? Real Options in Research, Patenting, and Market Introduction, 18 Int’l J. of Indus. 
Org. 1105 (arguing that, absent patent protection, a party must immediately bring its new 
technology to the public in order to avoid the possibility that another party could introduce 
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knowledge may not be realized for process inventions because some processes can be 
economically exploited without revealing the new process to the public (e.g., processes 
utilized in manufacturing of goods where the utilized process is not obvious from the 
manufactured good).   
Under  such  considerations,  to  the  extent  that  Bilski has  deviated  from  the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Benson that it “[did] not hold that no process patent could 
ever qualify if it did not [involve a machine or a physical transformation,]” there are two 
means by which the Machine or Transformation test will continue to incentivize “new, 
onrushing technology.”124 First, to the extent that presently unforeseen technologies fall 
outside the ambit  of the Machine or Transformation test,  Bilski expressly reserves the 
right  to  adapt  it  to  future  technologies.  Second,  market  incentives  exist  to  promote 
technological  growth  until  the  Machine  or  Transformation  test  can  be  appropriately 
altered to encompass them.  
B. Judge Rader’s Dissent:  Plain Language Interpretation
In his dissent, Judge Rader expressed concern that the Federal Circuit departed 
from Supreme Court precedent stating that § 101 should be construed pursuant to its plain 
language.125 He emphasized that § 101 provides for the protection of “any new and useful 
process.”126 Shortly thereafter, he noted an exception to this rule:  a fundamental principle 
cannot constitute a patentable process.127 Accordingly, Judge Rader would have simply 
denied  the  patentability  of  the  Application  by  stating  that  the  claims  constituted  a 
fundamental principle and therefore, were not patentable.  
It  is  in  order  to  further  this  prohibition  (on  the  patenting  of  fundamental 
principles) that  Bilski adopted the Machine or Transformation test. The  Bilski majority 
sought  to  describe a  standard by which courts  and the USPTO could readily  discern 
“whether  a  claim to a  process  is  patentable  under  §  101  or,  conversely, is  drawn to 
unpatentable subject matter because it claims only a fundamental principle.”128 As such, 
pursuant to the very language of the majority, both parties (the majority and the dissent) 
seek the same thing:  the exclusion of fundamental principles from § 101. They simply 
differ on their approaches to the goal.   
equivalent technology before it does because the initial inventor cannot rely on the patent system 
to protect its innovation).  
124 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
125 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 
129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964) (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
126 Id. (alteration in original).  
127 See id. at 1012-13.
128 Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
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Judge Rader’s approach enjoys the benefit of simplicity; any process is patentable 
if  it  is  not  a  fundamental  principle  and  complies  with  all  other  statutory  mandates. 
However, such an approach would necessarily burden the USPTO and the courts with 
questions  they  are  not  readily  equipped  to  handle  because  this  approach  requires 
answering metaphysical questions such as “What is an abstract idea?”129  
In contrast,  the  Bilski majority adopted a prophylactic  rule of patentability for 
processes.  This  prophylactic  rule  seeks  to  protect  the  interest  in  the  proscription  on 
patenting fundamental principles by imposing a positive rule that may narrow the realm 
of patentable subject matter more than is required by § 101. The correlation between all 
patentable processes and the scope of the Machine or Transformation test might not be 
exact—this shortcoming was recognized by Bilski’s concession that its rule may need be 
revised at some point in the future to permit the patenting of new technologies. However, 
this potential shortcoming is made up for by a single fact:  the USPTO and the courts are 
fully prepared for, and capable of, delineating what is a process that utilizes a machine or 
achieves a physical transformation. Accordingly, deviation from the explicit wording of 
the Patent Act is warranted by the expectation of a consistent and reliable application of 
§ 101 by the courts and the USPTO.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s use of a prophylactic rule to preclude violation 
of an underlying principle is consistent with similar approaches taken by the Supreme 
Court.  In  Bilski,  the  court  recognized  the  inherent  difficulty  in  applying  the  general 
prohibitions on patenting fundamental principles. Thus, the Machine or Transformation 
test was implemented to create a manner by which these prohibitions could be protected 
though the application of an easier-to-apply standard. This is analogous to the Supreme 
Court’s  use  of  prophylactic  rules  in  criminal  procedure  cases.130 For  example,  in  its 
approach to protecting the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, the Court 
adopted Miranda warnings as a means of preventing violations of this right. Despite the 
fact that these warnings do not recite the rule that they were created to protect, these rules 
promote avoidance of Fifth Amendment violations during police custody.131 Similarly, in 
Bilski, the Federal Circuit has adopted a standard (the Machine or Transformation test) 
that will allow the USPTO and the courts to avoid encroaching on a fundamental rule of 
patent law (the proscription of patenting fundamental principles) during prosecution and 
litigation without actually reciting the underlying proscriptions. 
These considerations establish Bilski’s consistency with pertinent case law and its 
underlying policies. Moreover,  Bilski is consistent with the primary goal of the patent 
system:  incentivizing invention. 
129 See discussion supra Part II.b.
130 See generally Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of  
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100, 105-15 (1985) (providing examples of the 
Supreme Court's adoption of prophylactic rules in the context of criminal procedure).
131 Id. at 106-11.  
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V. BILSKI AND THE PREDICTABILITY OF U.S. PATENT LAWS  
A  basic  concern  for  any branch of  law  is  “whether  it  provides  a  mechanism 
whereby the participants can reasonably predict the outcome of [a proceeding] prior to 
the actual decision.”132 Such a statement is consistent with a basic value inherent in the 
rule of law, namely that law should be predictable.133 This value is no less applicable to 
the patent laws than to any other area of jurisprudence.  
In 1982, Congress created the Federal Circuit when it passed the Federal Court 
Improvements Act.134 This statute was an attempt to standardize and strengthen patent 
law.135 Specifically,  the  Federal  Circuit  was  intended  to,  among  other  things,  curb 
tremendous  variances  in  the  application  of  patent  laws  across  the  U.S.136 In  turn, 
Congress expected this judicial stability to create a level of predictability which would 
allow for  confident  commercial  investment  in  innovation.137 Such investment  is  only 
available in the presence of uniform expectations regarding the validity of patents and the 
expected  outcome  of  contemplated  litigation.138 An  investigation  into  the  nature  of 
investment in research and development and a discussion of the expected application of 
Bilski lead to the conclusion that the implementation of the Machine or Transformation 
test  is  likely  to  bring  about  the  aforementioned  “uniform expectations”  necessary  to 
encourage innovation.  
A. Investments in Research and Development
 Firms  generally  invest  to  maximize  profits.139 However,  firms’  investment 
decisions are tempered by their  risk aversion.140 Uncertainty about the profitability of 
potential  investments,  such  as  the  patentability  of  products  and  processes  developed 
132 Gerald P. Moran, A Radical Theory of Jurisprudence: The “Decisionmaker” as the Source  
of Law—The Ohio Supreme Court's Adoption of the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine as a Model, 30 
Akron L. Rev. 393, 440 (1997).
133 Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 165, 194 
(2008).
134 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
135 Donald S. Chisum et al., Principles of Patent Law 23 (3d ed. 2004).
136 Id.
137 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(“It was recognized [when the Federal Circuit was created] that a nationally uniform, consistent, 
and correct patent law is an essential foundation of technological innovation, which is today the 
dominant contributor to the nation's economy.”), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 110 (2007).
138 Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(internal citations omitted).
139 Elizabeth Webster, The Economics of Intangible Investment 22 (1999).
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through  research  and  development,  can  promote  risk-adverse  behavior;  conversely, 
certainty of reward can promote investment.141 
External factors, i.e. factors beyond or outside a firm’s control, may contribute to 
the uncertainty attendant to a particular investment, and, accordingly, may influence the 
ability of a firm to reap rewards from its investment.142 Therefore, firms must carefully 
scrutinize the information upon which they base their predictions regarding the effect of 
external  factors.143 The  higher  the  information  variability  (the  extent  to  which  such 
information is considered to be of lesser reliability),144 the less likely the firm believes 
itself  able  to  control  the  uncertainty  of  an  investment.  Therefore,  the  higher  the 
information variability, the less likely a firm is to invest in innovation.  
Accordingly, in order to successfully incentivize innovation, the U.S. patent laws 
must  minimize  the  variability  of  information  available  to  firms  that  may  invest  in 
research and development.  Although the federal  government  has limited  control  over 
external factors regarding the information that a firm may rely upon in deciding whether 
to invest, it has control over one important piece of information:  the predictability of 
patent laws. Consequently, by allowing firms to easily recognize which inventions may 
warrant a patent, the government is able to remove uncertainty and encourage investment. 
In the past, the United States’ intellectual property laws incentivized research and 
development by creating an atmosphere in which researchers, and their financial backers, 
could undergo their work with a certain degree of  predictability regarding the scope of 
their potential patent rights.145 In such an atmosphere, technological innovation thrived.146 
Prior to  Bilski, however, uncertainty crept into the scope of patentable subject matter, 
particularly with regard to process patents.147  
140 Id. at 23.  
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Richard Butler et al., Strategic Investment Decisions: Theory, Practice and Process 22 
(1993).
144 Id.
145 Brit T. Brown & Benjamin A. Escobar, Wind Power: Generating Electricity and Lawsuits, 
28 Energy L.J. 489, 497 (2007).
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Federal Circuit’s pre-Bilski test for patentability of a 
process would, if applied to past Supreme Court cases, come to divergent results); see also 
discussion supra note 71 (explaining that the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible test is of limited 
practical value and that each of the individual adjectives introduces a further element of 
uncertainty).
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B. Predictability and the Application of Bilski
The implementation of the Machine or Transformation test will  serve the U.S. 
patent regime by setting forth a single positive rule that establishes a predictable means 
by which practitioners and inventors can determine, to a reasonable degree, if an invented 
process  is  patentable.  The  proscription  against  patenting  fundamental  principles,  on 
which the Machine or Transformation test is based, has historically been enforced as a 
series of negative prohibitions, such as “mathematical algorithms . . . are not patentable 
subject  matter.”148 Such  negative  rules  were  difficult  to  consistently  implement,  and 
accordingly, in hopes of clarifying the scope of § 101, the judiciary began to implement a 
vast  array  of  standards  to  determine  what  constitutes  a  patentable  process.149 
Unfortunately, the implementation of these various rules only led to a further confused 
state of affairs, and therefore, prior to Bilski, the Federal Circuit attempted to clarify the 
scope of § 101 when it announced a singular standard: the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible 
test.   This  standard  has  been  fraught  with  questions  over  its  interpretation,150 and, 
recently, over its consistency with Supreme Court mandates.151  
In contrast, the Machine or Transformation test sets forth a basic positive rule by 
which fundamental principles can be excluded from the scope of patentable processes:  a 
process is patentable if it involves a physical transformation or a physical apparatus.152 
While  Bilski does not define the full  scope of the Machine or Transformation test,  it 
instructs  that  “a  careful  analysis  of  [Supreme  Court  precedent]  and  the  subsequent 
jurisprudence of [the Federal Circuit] applying those decisions . . . [should inform] our 
understanding of the Court's machine-or-transformation test.”153 The implementation of 
such a simple and succinct rule, in conjunction with reference to prior case law, should 
enable businesses and inventors to conduct research with a preliminary understanding of 
the  potential  scope  of  their  patent  rights.  The  resultant  predictability  should  allow 
invention to flourish.
Moreover,  this  predictability  will  be  furthered  by a  secondary,  but  important, 
pronouncement in  Bilski:  § 101 need not be addressed prior to any other investigation 
into the patentability of an application.154 Under this rule, one can expect that any future 
developments  of  §  101  jurisprudence  (with  respect  to  process  inventions)  will  be 
148 In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
149 See discussion supra Part II.d.
150 See discussion supra note 71.
151 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 136-37.
152 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).  Moreover, Bilski’s declaration that a § 101 
analysis can occur before or after any other evaluation (such as §§ 102, 103, or 112) will allow a 
further simplified prosecution process.  
153 Id. at 954 n.7.
154 Id. at 951 n.1.  
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established  only  in  cases  in  which  §  101  presents  the  single  outcome  determinative 
question, as opposed to adjudicating artificial questions of patentable subject matter in 
cases where §§ 102, 103, or 112 would be easily applied to reject a claim. Such artificial 
adjudication undercuts the judiciary’s ability to create a strong collection of case law that 
can be expected to be predictably applied.155    
1. Section 101 as a Threshold Requirement
  As an issue of statutory interpretation, the scope of § 101 necessarily relies upon 
judicial interpretation to delineate the bounds of patentable processes. Accordingly, the 
predictability of § 101 jurisprudence is dependent upon the quality of case law on the 
subject.  
The  determination  of  whether  a  claimed  invention  presents  patentable  subject 
matter has frequently been described as an inquiry that must be addressed prior to all 
other  evaluations.156 This  interpretation  commonly presents the USPTO and the court 
system  with  difficult,  and  patently  unnecessary,  determinations  over  the  scope  of 
statutory subject matter.157 Such a regime would require the resolution of § 101 issues for 
claims  that  would  be  rejected  under  §§  102,  103,  or  112.158 This  situation  would 
necessitate  the  evolution  of  §  101  jurisprudence  through  the  evaluation  of  artificial 
questions arising from patent applications that are unlikely to issue regardless of the § 
101 determination because they would subsequently be rejected on other grounds.159 Such 
is the breeding ground of bad law.160
155 See Morris, supra note 37, at 6.
156 See, e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,  
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (D. Del. 1983).  
157 See Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law & Policy 22 (4th ed. Supp. 2008-09), 
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/texts/pdf/Patent%20Book%20Update
%202008-2009_FINAL.pdf.  
158 See id. (“Under this issue hierarchy (with section 101 first), important and difficult section 
101 issues may have to be decided under the worst possible sets of facts, for example, where the 
inventions are not properly enabled, wildly broad, not operative, obvious, or indeed just a bit 
loony.”) (emphasis in original).
159 The author does not advocate resolving § 101 issues only after resolving all other issues. 
Rather, simple § 101 issues that are unlikely to create new precedent can, and should, be 
addressed when a simple rejection is available.  To hold otherwise would potentially require the 
unnecessary adjudication of artificial §§ 102, 103, or 112 issues.  
160 See Morris, supra note 37, at 6.  Specifically, Dr. Morris posited:  
If the Patent Office must consider 101, then from the point of view of both reason and 
efficiency, it should do so only after the claims are in condition for allowance under 102, 103 and 
112. This would greatly reduce the number of cases where patentable subject matter is an issue. It 
would also improve the quality of the debate: just as bad cases make bad law, bad patent claims 
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This perception of the sequence of evaluating patent applications stems from dicta 
in Diamond v. Diehr, which stated that “Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in isolation, 
but when a process [implementing a fundamental principle is devised,] that process is at 
the very least not barred  at the threshold by § 101.”161 The court in  Bilski apparently 
recognized this unnecessary handicap and clarified the proper meaning of “threshold” as 
used in  Diehr.  Although Bilski held that “[w]hether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible 
subject  matter  under  §  101 is  a  threshold  inquiry,”162 it  also  recognized  that  “if  the 
examiner deems it appropriate, she may reject the claim on any other ground(s) without 
addressing  § 101.”163 As  understood by such a  use,  the  term “threshold”  is  properly 
construed to mean a barrier that must be cleared, but not necessarily the primary or initial 
barrier that must be hurdled.164 This understanding of patent law is supported by multiple 
observations.
Initially,  it  appears  that  proponents  of  the  “§  101  inquiry  first”  view  have 
stumbled into the common logical flaw that the order of an enumerated list necessarily 
connotes a hierarchical valuation. This logical fallacy is reminiscent of the first year law 
student who argues that the rights granted under the First Amendment must necessarily 
bear particular significance (due to their placement at the front of the line), only to later 
find out that what eventually became the First Amendment was originally proposed as the 
third amendment.165 Just as there is no reason to give the First Amendment precedence 
over the others on account of its placement, there is no reason to give special precedence 
to § 101 simply because it is numbered “first” in the Patent Act.  
Further evidence for this proposition is found through an investigation into cases 
cited as supporting the “§ 101 inquiry first” view. For example, courts commonly rely 
upon Parker v. Flook for the proposition that a § 101 evaluation necessarily must precede 
any  investigation  under  §§  102,  103,  or  112.166 However,  this  reliance  on  Flook is 
misplaced.  Initially,  the  parties  in  Flook did  not  brief  the  question  of  what  order  a 
make bad rules about what should, in the abstract, be patentable.
161 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) (emphasis added).  
162 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
163 Id. at 950 n.1.    
164 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1302 (11th ed. 2003) (defining “threshold” as 
“[a] level, point, or value above which something is true or will take place and below which it is 
not or will not”).
165 Anthony L. Fargo, The Concerto Without the Sheet Music: Revisiting the Debate Over  
First Amendment Protection for Information Gathering, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 43, 47 
n.39 (2006) (“What we know as the First Amendment was originally the third, but the first two 
proposed amendments, dealing with congressional pay and representation, were defeated.”).
166 See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (panel decision).  Comiskey 
provided:
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patentability  inquiry  must  follow.167 Further,  Flook  cited  no  authority  to  support  its 
conclusion that the § 101 inquiry must come first.168
In contrast to  Flook (where the order of sections discussion was unnecessary to 
the resolution of the case), the Supreme Court has held that a § 101 evaluation need not 
necessarily  occur  prior  to  other  patentability  inquiries.169 In  Dann v.  Johnston,  the 
Supreme Court was presented with arguments pertaining to both the general question of 
the scope of patentable subject matter and the obviousness of the invention before it.170 In 
determining on what grounds it would rule, the  Dann Court stated that there was “no 
need to treat  [the question pertaining to the scope of statutory subject matter]  in this 
case . . . because we conclude that in any event respondent's system is unpatentable on 
grounds of obviousness.”171 Accordingly, it would necessarily appear that the Supreme 
Court  has  recognized  the  propriety  of  conducting  an  obviousness  or  other  type  of 
patentability inquiry prior to considering § 101.
Under the flexible ordering of patent evaluation expressly authorized by  Bilski, 
the USPTO and courts may first address the simplest  grounds upon which to reject a 
patent application. Accordingly, § 101 issues are likely to be addressed only when such 
issues are outcome determinative or where § 101 presents the simplest  grounds upon 
which to reject a claim. This regime is likely to avoid difficult yet artificial adjudications 
of patentable subject matter and to create a base of case law from which the outcome of 
patent prosecution and litigation can be reasonably predicted.  
Only if the requirements of § 101 are satisfied is the inventor “allowed to pass through 
to” the other requirements for patentability, such as novelty under § 102 and, of pertinence to this 
case, non-obviousness under § 103. See [State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 
149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998)]. As the Supreme Court stated in Parker v. Flook, “[t]he 
obligation to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented [so as to determine 
whether it is “the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect”] must precede the 
determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.” 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) 
(emphases added).
Id. at 973; see also Merges & Duffy, supra note 157, at 22.
It is of note that Comiskey (Jan. 26, 2009) was decided after Bilski (Oct. 30, 2008). 
However, to the extent that Comiskey and Bilski are not consistent with regard to whether a § 101 
inquiry must be conducted prior to other evaluations, Bilski is binding precedent because Federal 
Circuit rules provide that “only the court en banc may overrule a binding precedent” (and 
Comiskey was a panel decision, while Bilski was an en banc decision).  Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(1).   
167 Merges & Duffy, supra note 157, at 22.
168 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
169 Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976); see also Robert Patrick Merges & John 
Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law & Policy: Cases & Materials 165 (3d ed. 2002).
170 Dann, 425 U.S. at 220.
171 Id. 
30
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 2010
a. Application of the Machine or Transformation Test
Beyond  undercutting  the  §  101  inquiry  first  rule,  if  Bilski is  to  encourage 
innovation by enhancing the predictability of patent law, its Machine or Transformation 
test must be applied with reference to objective standards. These necessary standards are 
provided through the text of the Bilski opinion and related federal case law.   
1. The Scope of the Machine or Transformation Test
While  Bilski does  not  elaborate  on  the  exact  scope  of  the  Machine  or 
Transformation test,  the Federal  Circuit  instructs that  “a careful analysis  of [Supreme 
Court  precedent]  and  the  subsequent  jurisprudence  of  this  court  applying  those 
decisions . . . informs our understanding of the Court's machine-or-transformation test.”172 
As such, an evaluation of prior precedent is informative as to the scope and application of 
the Machine or Transformation test. Accordingly, such an evaluation should allow both 
inventors  and  practitioners  to  predictably  define  what  constitutes  a  machine  or 
transformation  for  the  purposes  of  demarcating  the  ambit  of  §  101  with  regard  to 
patentable processes. 
a. Transformative Processes
The federal  judiciary has previously elaborated on the scope of transformative 
processes pertinent to the Machine or Transformation test. In Benson, the U.S. Supreme 
Court  proffered multiple  examples  of  what  constitutes  a  transformative  process  for  a 
§ 101  inquiry:   the  manufacturing  of  an  end  product  via  chemical  processing,173 the 
mechanical processing of metals,174 and the mechanical heating of incubating eggs (where 
the  transformation  was  the  development  and  eventual  hatching  of  the  eggs).175 
Subsequently,  the  Federal  Circuit  has  developed  the  definition  of  a  transformative 
process to include the physical transformation of electronic signals, seismic waves, and 
any other physical transformation not apparent to the naked eye.176  
172 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski  
v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
173 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 
721 (1880)).  
174 Id. (citing Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909)).  
175 Id. at 70-71 (citing Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 
(1935)).
176 See Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 9, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964), 2008 WL 1842279 (“[T]he transformation 
need not be mechanical or chemical; the production or modification of electronic signals has long 
been recognized as a form of transformation of matter for the purposes of determining whether a 
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An example of the Court’s willingness to find physical transformations present 
despite the fact that they are not apparent to the naked eye, in Arrhythmia Research the 
Federal Circuit found a process to be transformative because it embodied a method by 
which the heart's electrical signals could be transformed into a digital format that could 
be used to determine the current level of risk associated with the patient’s heart.177 The 
court  emphasized  that  “[t]he  view  that  ‘there  is  nothing  necessarily  physical  about 
‘signals’’  is incorrect.”178 The theme that a transformation of a signal invisible to the 
naked eye constituted a physical change was further developed in In re Taner, which held 
that  the  conversion  of  seismic  signals  into  a  different  form  constituted  a  physical 
transformation within the scope of § 101.179 Lastly, in In re Abele, the modification of X-
ray data to produce a better CAT-scan display was sufficient to warrant patentability.180 
This theme of physical transformations that are not apparent to the naked eye was further 
developed during the court’s discussion in Bilski.
In its initial evaluation of whether the Application presented patentable subject 
matter,  Bilski established a dichotomy between “public or private legal  obligations or 
relationships,  business  risks,  or  other  such  abstractions”  (which  cannot  satisfy  the 
Machine or Transformation test) and “physical objects or substances [or objects which 
are] representative of physical objects or substances” (which will satisfy the Machine or 
Transformation test).181 Thereafter, the court noted that Bilski asserted that “the process 
as claimed encompasses the exchange of only options, which are simply legal rights” and 
therefore, cannot satisfy the Machine or Transformation test.182 Thus,  Bilski established 
that any change in a legal obligation was insufficient to constitute a transformation for the 
purposes of § 101.183  
claimed process is patent-eligible subject matter.”).
177 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(In applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele standard, the Court stated that “[the] claimed steps of 
‘converting’, ‘applying’, ‘determining’, and ‘comparing’ are physical process steps that transform 
one physical, electrical signal into another.”).
178 Id. (citing In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 790 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
179 681 F.2d at 790-91 (“[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or 
applies that formula in a structure or process, which, when considered as a whole, is performing a 
function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article 
to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.”) (quoting 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)).
180 684 F.2d 902, 908-09 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (overruled on other grounds).
181 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
182 Id. at 964 (emphasis added).  
183 Bilski raised one notable question within the bounds of this discussion.  Early in the 
opinion, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]mportantly, however, the claim [at issue] is not limited to 
transactions involving actual commodities, and the application discloses that the recited 
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As such, it becomes apparent that one can expect the Machine or Transformation 
test  to  be  satisfied  by  processes  that  include  a  physical transformation,  even  if  the 
transformation  is  invisible  to  the  naked  eye  (e.g.,  the  transformation  of  an  electrical 
signal). In contrast, pursuant to  Bilski, it is equally apparent that a transformation that 
does not include a physical change (e.g., a change in legal standing) is not sufficient to 
satisfy the Machine or Transformation standard.  
b. Machine Implemented Processes
The  machine  requirement  from  Bilski is  derived  from  the  Supreme  Court’s 
statement in  Benson  that  a process that  is “tied to a particular  machine or apparatus” 
represents patentable subject matter.184 The machine requirement has been described as 
necessitating that an applicant “recite structure in the claims.”185 This standard has been 
restricted,  as  discussed  infra in  Part  V.b.ii.2  in  three  important  ways  to  prevent 
patentability by the mere: (1) recitation of machine, (2) use of a machine as a system for 
data gathering, and (3) recitation of extra-solution activity. 
One particular limitation on  Bilski’s machine requirement is of note.  A patent 
applicant will not be allowed to artfully draft an application such that it technically claims 
a  machine  invention  (for  the  purpose  of  §  101)  where  the  invention,  in  reality,  is  a 
process.186 To  this  end,  claims  reciting  means-plus  language  should be  construed  “as 
process  claims  if  there  is  no  supporting  structure  in  the  written  description  that 
corresponds to the claimed ‘means’ elements.”187
2. Meaningful Limits on a Claim’s Scope
Aside from the basic statement of the Machine or Transformation test, Bilski held 
that  a  transformation  or  apparatus  that  satisfies  the  §  101  test  must  also  “impose 
meaningful limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent-eligibility.”188 The requirement 
was later invoked in Bilski to necessitate that a transformation be “central to the purpose 
transactions may simply involve options . . . .” Id. at 950. Thus, one is left to question whether a 
trading scheme that required the trading of physical goods would be patentable.  Such a 
distinction would seem to be somewhat artificial.  Moreover, even if the Application did require 
the trading of physical wares, would not the application then merely recite the changing of (non-
physical) ownership rights in physical wares?  It would still appear that no physical change is 
present in that transaction either. 
184 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
185 Michael Melton, Patents as Public Notice, or How to Read a Patent Part II—Prosecution 
History, 479 PLI/Pat 453, 459 (1997).
186 Arshal v. United States, 621 F.2d 421, 428 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
187 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), abrogated on other grounds by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), 
cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
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of the claimed process” to satisfy the Machine or Transformation test.189 This language 
was included in  Bilski  to preclude artful drafting of patent claims to allow a particular 
claim to fall within the scope of § 101.190  
By way of example, if the Application’s claims had been written to specifically 
require that the hedging transactions be performed on a computer, it would appear that, at 
first blush, the claims would fall within § 101 by requiring the use of a physical apparatus 
(the  computer)  during  the  performance  of  the  hedging  operation.191 It  would  seem 
illogical to deem Bilski’s hedging scheme unpatentable as originally written, but find it 
satisfies  §  101  if  it  were  to  recite  the  (potentially  superfluous)  requirement  that  a 
computer be utilized. To allow a claim to fall within the scope of § 101 through such 
artifice would “exalt form over substance.”192
Three basic premises  of patent  law have been recognized to avoid such artful 
drafting:  (1) a restriction on the field of an invention’s use cannot be utilized to avoid a 
§ 101 rejection,193 (2) data gathering is insufficient to bring non-patentable subject matter 
into the ambit of § 101,194 and (3) insignificant extra-solution activity is insufficient, by 
itself, to bring an invention into the scope of statutory subject matter.195 Beyond these 
three restrictions, the  Bilski court expressly left open the question of “whether or when 
recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.”196 Based 
upon  the  logic  set  forth  in  the  aforementioned  rules  to  avoid  artful  drafting,  it  can 
reasonably be expected that the judiciary will hold that “meaningful limits on [a] claim’s 
scope” are not, per se, imparted by a simple recitation that the invention can be (or is) 
carried out on a computer or machine.197
188 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961.
189 Id. at 962.
190 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (warning that a “competent draftsman” 
could draft claims that would evade exclusions from § 101). It is of note that Bilski also required 
that “the involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be 
insignificant extra-solution activity.” Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. This requirement was stated as 
being distinct from the “meaningful limits” inquiry. Id. However, since both requirements seek to 
avoid artful drafting of patent claims to avoid § 101 rejections, this Article will address the 
elements as a single inquiry.
191 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (noting that the Application’s claims do not include a physical 
apparatus-type limitation).  
192 In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
193 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.  
194 In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
195 Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294.
196 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
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a. Field Restrictions
The Supreme Court in Diehr found that the inclusion of a field-of-use limitation198 
was insufficient, standing alone, to bring unpatentable fundamental principles—such as a 
law of  nature or an abstract  idea—within  the ambit  of §  101.199 This  basic  rule  was 
further  expounded  upon  in  Parker  v.  Flook,  where  the  Court  recognized  that  the 
Pythagorean  Theorem  could  not  be  brought  into  the  scope  of  §  101  though  artful 
drafting.200 Specifically,  including  a  claim  limitation  that  this  mathematical  equation 
could  be  used  within  a  specific  field  of  technology  would  not  suffice  to  bring  the 
Pythagorean Theorem out of the realm of fundamental principles and into the realm of a 
patentable process.201   
b. Data Gathering
The  act  of  data  collection  is  an  insufficient  physical  limitation  to  establish  a 
statutory application of an unpatentable fundamental principle.202 The Federal Circuit, in 
In re Grams, explained this rule as it applies to a non-statutory mathematical algorithm.203 
The  court  reasoned  that  if  the  mere  input  of  data  were  sufficient  to  establish  a 
mathematical  algorithm as  statutory  subject  matter,  then  all  mathematical  algorithms 
would be within the ambit of § 101, as all algorithms require inputting data.204 Such could 
not be the case because if it  were, the exclusion of mathematical algorithms from the 
scope of § 101 would be completely defeated. Further, the court stated that if the input of 
197 See generally Brief for Consumers Union, Electric Frontier Foundation, and Public 
Knowledge as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 16-17, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-
964), 2008 WL 1842260 (arguing that, in determining whether an invention falls within § 101, 
courts should consider:  “Is the technology claimed merely that the process is capable of being 
carried out on a machine?” and “Is the technology claimed merely that the process is actually 
carried out by a machine?”) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
198 A field-of-use limitation is a claim limitation stating that an invention is to be used within a 
particular field of technology.
199 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981) (Mathematical algorithms cannot be patented 
and this “principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a 
particular technological environment.”) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).      
200 437 U.S. at 590.
201 Id.
202 In re Meyer, 668 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
203 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Note that a mathematical algorithm is an abstract 
idea (a fundamental principle).  
204 Id. 
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data is not sufficient to establish patentability,  then the “old and necessary antecedent 
steps  of  establishing  values  for  the  variables  in  the  equation  cannot  convert  the 
unpatentable method to patentable subject matter [either].”205  
A second example of the exclusion of data gathering steps from the category of 
meaningful limitations that may render a process patentable is found in the 2004 Federal 
Circuit  case of  Metabolite  Laboratories  v.  Laboratory  Corp.  of  America  Holdings.206 
Claim 13 of the challenged patent in Metabolite sought protection of a method to detect 
cobalamin  or  folate  deficiencies  by  correlating  these  shortages  with  an  elevated 
homocysteine level.207 The challenged claim sought protection of:
A method  for  detecting  a  deficiency of  cobalamin  or  folate  in  warm-blooded 
animals comprising the steps of:
assaying  a  body fluid for  an  elevated  level  of  total  homocysteine;  and 
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid with 
a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.208
Accordingly, the application attempted to claim a method that consisted of two 
steps: (1) taking a sample of body fluid and testing it for elevated homocysteine; and (2) 
correlating an elevated level with a vitamin deficiency. Such an invention would not be 
patentable under the Machine or Transformation test.  
Bilski provides that the transformation or apparatus must also “impose meaningful 
limits on the claim’s scope to impart patent-eligibility.”209 Accordingly, a proper manner 
of approaching the Metabolite claim is to initially determine which claimed step involved 
a  machine  or  transformation.  Claim  13’s  first  step  could  satisfy  the  Machine  or 
Transformation test through the use of the device necessary to initially test the sample. 
However,  the mere  correlation  required  by the second step is  unlikely to  satisfy this 
standard. Accordingly,  the next question is whether the assaying step would provide a 
meaningful limit on the claim.  It would not.  
As described above, data gathering is implicit in the application of any correlation 
(e.g., a mathematical algorithm or a natural law). Such is the nature of the sampling and 
testing of the bodily fluid in this claim. The sole purpose of the testing is to provide raw 
data (the homocysteine level) such that it can be applied to a correlation (the connection 
of elevated homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiencies). Thus, since the sole process 
step that provides for a machine or transformation is merely a data-gathering step that 
205 Id. 
206 370 F.3d 1354.
207 Id. at 1358-59.  
208 Id.
209In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964). 
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imparts no substantial limitations on the claim, this claim would fail under the Machine 
or Transformation standard.210
c. Insignificant Extra-Solution Activity 
The  Supreme Court  has  said  that  “insignificant  post-solution  activity  will  not 
transform an unpatentable  principle  into a patentable  process.”211 This prohibition has 
most commonly been applied as a proscription on granting patents where the application 
comprises a mathematical algorithm with some secondary physical limitation or activity 
attached to the claim in hopes of entering the realm of statutory subject matter.212 For 
example, the recording of data resulting from the application of a mathematical algorithm 
has been deemed insufficient to bring an unpatentable invention into the ambit of § 101, 
despite the fact that such a recording requires a physical apparatus.213 Such secondary 
physical activity is “implicit in any application of a mathematical algorithm” and thus is 
insufficient to make an invention patentable.214
d. The Computer as the Sole Machine or Transformation
The court in Bilski expressly left open the question of “whether or when recitation 
of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.”215 As is common 
with the above-described case law limitations on § 101, this question drives at the basic 
tenet that a patent applicant should not be able to deny the use of a fundamental principle 
to  the  public  by the  mere  artful  drafting  of  a  claim to  technically  fall  into  a  §  101 
category.216  
210 Unfortunately, this result cannot be compared to a ruling on the patentability of this claim 
because the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari in this case prior to ruling on the 
§ 101 issue and no underlying court ruled on this issue either.  Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.  
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 124 (2006) (per curiam).
211 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978)).  
212 See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that most insignificant 
activity is implicit in the claimed invention).  
213 In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 770 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (overruled on other grounds).
214 Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294.
215 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v.  
Doll, 129 S.Ct. 2735 (June 1, 2009) (No. 08-964).
216 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“[A] principle is not patentable.  A principle, in 
the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no 
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”).
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This  concern  is  apparent  in  the  Supreme  Court’s  Benson decision.  Benson’s 
eighth  claim  specifically  required  the  use  of  a  reentrant  shift  register217—a piece  of 
computer hardware used at the time of Benson’s invention.218 Despite this recitation of 
hardware,  the  Court  still  rejected  Benson’s  eighth  claim.219 In  finding  the  invention 
outside  of  the  scope  of  §  101,  Benson deemed  that  a  patent  on  this  computer-
implemented mathematical algorithm would, in essence, “be a patent on the algorithm 
itself” and would “wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula . . . .”220  
Accordingly, the necessary conclusion from Benson is that the recitation of use of 
a computer is not sufficient to create a patentable process. This conclusion is consistent 
with  the  judicially-imposed  limitation  that  a  process  does  not  become  statutory  by 
reciting some insignificant step or apparatus outside the newly created invention (i.e., 
post-solution activity,  data gathering steps, or field restrictions).  It would be logically 
inconsistent to say that a process does not become statutory through the inclusion of some 
insignificant post-solution activity, but to find that a process is patentable simply because 
it is recited that the process is (or may be) conducted on a computer (a limitation that 
could be completely insignificant).
Thus, in determining whether a process is statutory, a court is likely to address 
whether  the  sole  transformation  or  apparatus  found  in  the  invention  involves  the 
tangential use of a computer. If the computer use were merely tangential, then, pursuant 
to  Benson, the Court or the USPTO would be expected to reject the claim, rather than 
allowing a patent to issue on a fundamental principle though artful drafting.221  
The  distinction  between  the  tangential  use  of  a  computer  and  the  use  of  a 
computer that would impart substantial limitations on a claim, such that it would satisfy 
the Machine or Implementation test, began to take shape shortly after the issuance of the 
Bilski opinion.  In  Ex  Parte  Halligan,  the  BPAI  considered  the  patentability  of  a 
“programmed computer method” employed to identify trade secrets within a pool of data 
containing trade secrets and other information.222 In determining if claim 119 contained 
217 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972).
218 Gregory A. Stobbs, Business Method Patents 47 (2001).
219 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.  
220 Id. at 71-72.
221 See id.  
222 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1355, 1356-57 (B.P.A.I. 2008). Claim 119, the claim at issue, sought 
protection for:
A programmed computer method based upon the six factors of a trade secret from the 
First Restatement of Torts for identifying trade secrets within a plurality of potential trade secrets 
of a business, where each of the plurality of potential trade secrets comprise information, said 
method implemented by the programmed computer to effect the following steps:
a) the programmed computer providing a predetermined criteria for evaluating a potential 
trade secret of the plurality of potential trade secrets under each of the six factors of a trade secret 
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patentable information, the BPAI evaluated whether the singular use of hardware within 
the method (a recitation that the process utilized a programmed computer)  imposed a 
substantial  limitation  on  the  claim  such  that  it  would  constitute  patentable  subject 
matter.223 In  determining  that  the  claim was  not  patentable,  the  BPAI noted  that  the 
recitation of the computer “adds nothing more than a general purpose computer that has 
been programmed in an unspecific manner to implement the functional steps recited in 
the claims.”224 It would appear that the BPAI drew a line between computers that are 
“programmed in an unspecific manner” and specifically programmed computers, such as 
those utilizing specific software. Therefore, it seems that the use of a computer will be 
deemed  merely  tangential  when  no  specifics  of  its  manner  of  use  are  described  or 
necessary.  In  contrast,  a  method  that  exploits  specific  programming  to  bring about  a 
specific result would presumably constitute a substantial limitation that would satisfy the 
Machine or Transformation test. 
As  described  above,  Bilski’s  Machine  or  Transformation  test  rests  upon  a 
significant  body  of  precedent.  Accordingly,  Bilski’s  future  application  should  be 
reasonably  predictable.  This  predictability  can  be  expected  to  further  research  and 
development, thus promoting innovation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The scope of patentable processes under § 101 has undergone various iterations 
throughout the history of the U.S. patent system. Initial limitations were presented by the 
judicial  creation of negative rules proscribing the patenting of fundamental  principles, 
such  as  abstract  ideas  and laws  of  nature.  However,  due  to  difficulties  in  consistent 
application of these proscriptions, § 101 jurisprudence continued to evolve into positive 
statements of what constitute patentable processes. This constant evolution has reached 
from the First Restatement of Torts, said six factors including (1) the extent to which the 
information is known outside of the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees 
and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the business to guard the 
secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to the business and its competitors; 
(5) the amount of time, effort or money expended by the business in developing the information 
and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated 
by others; 
b) the programmed computer receiving a numerical score value for the potential trade 
secret under the predetermined criteria for each of the six factors; 
c) the programmed computer calculating a metric from the received numerical score 
values under the six factors; and
d) the programmed computer determining that the potential trade secret is a trade secret 
when the calculated metric exceeds a predetermined threshold value.
223 Id. at 1364-65. Note that the claim was not argued to involve a physical transformation.
224 Id. at 1365.
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its current state with the creation of  Bilski’s Machine or Transformation test. This test 
presents  a  positive  statement  of  what  is  patentable  and describes  the  full  ambit  of 
statutory  processes  under  §  101:   a  patentable  process  is  either  tied  to  a  particular 
machine or apparatus or transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.  
Bilski’s  Machine  or  Transformation  test  is  a  proper  synthesis  of  case  law 
addressing the scope of § 101. First, Bilski’s test is a necessary alternative to the highly 
criticized test set forth in State Street (the Useful, Concrete, and Tangible test). Second, 
the  Machine  or  Transformation  test  is  consistent  with  Supreme  Court  precedent 
pertaining to the scope of § 101. Finally,  Bilski furthers the basic goal of patent law, 
incentivizing  innovation,  by enhancing  the  predictability  of  the application  of  §  101, 
which  encourages  investment  in  research  and  development.   In  light  of  these 
considerations, Bilski’s Machine or Transformation test is a proper standard for the scope 
of patentable processes under § 101.  
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